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1. INTRODUCTION
Workers’ compensation in South Africa is regulated by the 
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act of 
1993 (COIDA).1 Among other functions, the COIDA sets up 
a system of no-fault compensation for employees who are 
injured or contract diseases because of their job. More pre-
cisely, it establishes that, with few exceptions, an aggrieved 
party is entitled to compensation without the concurrent 
necessity to prove that any other party is at fault.1,2
It is well-known that the presence of workers’ compensa-
tion creates excess burdens, or social ineffi ciencies, espec-
ially in the form of what economics terms moral hazard.3-6 
Moral hazard basically involves a shifting of responsibility:  it 
occurs when an individual behaves differently according to 
whether or not she fully will bear the costs tied to the conse-
quences of her actions. For example, if our home is insured 
against theft, then we may more often leave the windows ajar 
when we go to work, i.e. we are willing to incur a higher risk 
of theft as the insurance company will be responsible for the 
consequences of theft. When there are misaligned incentives 
between the insured and the insurer, because some of the 
actions of the insured – such as leaving the windows ajar – are 
hidden to the insurer, we have room for moral hazard. With 
workers’ compensation – itself a form of insurance – matters 
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are not much different. Classic moral hazard examples in this 
case include an employee taking less care on the job (e.g., 
not always wearing rubber gloves or safety goggles when 
required), reporting a permanent disablement that is not 
causally related to the job (e.g., she could report a domestic 
accident as a work accident), and an employee intentionally 
injuring herself.7,8 The bottom line is that moral hazard is 
one refl ection of what economics terms rational behaviour 
– namely that an individual usually opts for what’s best for
her based on the evaluation of personal relative costs and 
benefi ts, and not necessarily based on any ethical conduct or 
calculation of resulting cost transferred onto others.
For simplicity, this article solely considers misaligned 
incentives tied to some aspects of the relation between two 
extant public institutions, viz. minimum wages and permanent 
disablement coverage. It points out how at present, for some 
sectors, the simultaneous public provision of a minimum 
wage and permanent disablement coverage increases moral 
hazard scope, suggesting that the full socioeconomic objec-
tives of compensation are neither as effi cient nor as equitable 
as commonly thought.
The argument considers matters from the perspective of 
workers’ compensation. Moreover, it employs stylized facts, 
a common heuristic expedient in economics to abstract from 
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data trends to aid theoretical reasoning.9-11 The stylized facts 
are two, in the main regard minimum and maximum benefi ts for 
permanent disablement and a sample of minimum wages, and 
are based on recent data that are openly available. The fi rst 
stylized fact identifi es the origin of the moral hazard of interest, 
while the second – which defi nes our principal concern – indi-
cates why the scope of the moral hazard of interest widens as 
time goes by. Thus, our point about exacerbating misaligned 
incentives derives from institutional considerations, rather than 
from any moral hazard instance.  We conclude, however, that 
not all may be lost, at least as regards the second fact: there 
are some policy options that are not in the main overly drastic, 
and that at the same time remind us about how important it is 
to perform careful institutional design.
2. COVERAGE FOR PERMANENT
 DISABLEMENT ACCORDING TO THE COIDA:  
SOME BASICS
Permanent disablement, which can range from 1% to 100%, 
means that an occupational injury or disease results in a 
permanent anatomical defect, loss of anatomical function or 
disfi gurement that is tantamount to disablement for employ-
ment.1 Permanent disablement thus can include total or par-
tial loss of a limb, impairment of movement of a joint, loss of 
vision or hearing, restricted lung function, or loss of an organ. 
Table 1 reports degrees of permanent disablement.
Under the COIDA, compensation for permanent disable-
ment is paid either in a lump-sum or as a monthly pension 
depending on the degree of disablement. Permanent 
PEER REVIEWED
Injury Percentage of permanent disablement
Loss of two limbs 100
Loss of both hands, or of all fi ngers and both thumbs 100
Total loss of sight 100
Total paralysis 100
 Injuries resulting in employee being permanently bedridden 100
Loss of arm at shoulder 65
Loss of arm between elbow and shoulder 65
Loss of arm at elbow 55
Loss of arm between wrist and elbow 55
Loss of hand at wrist 50
Loss of four fi ngers and thumb of one hand 50
Loss of four fi ngers 40
Loss of thumb: Both phalanges 25
One phalanx 15
Loss of index fi nger: Three phalanges 10
Two phalanges 8
One phalanx 5
Loss of ring fi nger: Three phalanges 8
Two phalanges 6
One phalanx 4
Loss of little fi nger: Three phalanges 6
Two phalanges 5
One phalanx 3
Loss of metacarpals: First, second or third (additional) 4
Fourth or fi fth (additional) 2
Loss of leg: At hip 70
Between knee and hip 45 to 70
Below knee 35 to 45
Loss of toes: All 15
Big, both phalanges 7
Big, one phalanx 3
                                               
Four toes 7
Three toes 5
Two toes 3
One toe 1
Loss of eye: Whole eye 30
Sight 30
Sight except perception of light 30
Loss of hearing: Both ears 50
One ear 7
Table 1. Degree of permanent disablement1
Note 1: Total permanent loss of the use of a limb shall be treated as the loss of the limb.
Note 2:  Any injury to the left arm or hand and, in the case of a left-handed employee, to the right arm or hand, may in the discretion of the 
Director-General be rated at ninety percent of the above percentage.
Note 3:  If there are two or more injuries the sum of the percentages for such injuries may be increased, in the discretion of the Director-
General.
Toes other than big toes:
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disablement assessed to be within the inclusive range 
from 1% to 30% is paid in the form of a lump-sum.1  For 
the calculation of permanent disablement within this inclu-
sive range, the upper limit of 30% acts as the yardstick for 
calculations of compensation for permanent disablement 
below it. For example, the lump-sum compensation for 
30% permanent disablement is calculated at 15 times an 
employee’s earnings as prescribed by the COIDA, subject 
to a prescribed maximum and minimum of such earnings. 
Thus, the lump-sum compensation in the event of perman-
ent disablement at less than 30% is calculated pro rata to 
the lump-sum for 30%.
For permanent disablement assessed within the inclu-
sive range from 1% to 30%, the 2009 minimum earnings 
threshold is R2790 per month and the maximum earnings 
threshold is R11 163 per month. If an employee earns less 
than the minimum earnings threshold, her compensation 
will be calculated using the minimum earnings fi gure rather 
than her own wage.  Therefore, the minimum lump-sum 
compensation for 30% permanent disablement is R41850 
(i.e., 15 × R2790).
To illustrate, consider the case of the permanent dis-
ablement from the loss of one ear. According to the COIDA 
guidelines reproduced in Table 1, this is a 7% permanent dis-
ablement that will yield the lump-sum compensation of [(7% 
× 100)/30)] × (15 × Monthly Gross Earnings). The generic 
calculation for permanent disablement up to 30% – where the 
monthly earnings are subject to the minimum and maximum 
prescribed by the COIDA – accordingly is,
[(% Disablement × 100)/30] × (15 × Monthly Gross 
Earnings),
where (% Disablement) is determined by Section 2 of the 
COIDA.
If the permanent disablement is assessed at 31% inclu-
sive or more, then the employee will receive a monthly pen-
sion for life. Compensation for 100% permanent disablement 
is calculated at 75% of the employee’s monthly earnings, 
again subject to a prescribed maximum and minimum of such 
earnings. The pension for permanent disablement, within the 
Agriculture – Farm worker 2092.50 1316.69 -37 – – –
Community, social 
& personal services Hair salon General assistant 2092.50 1756.81 -16 1875.00 1611.76 -14
Construction Building Labourer/cleaner 2092.50 1920.44 -8 1875.00 1769.93 -6
Construction Building Labourer 2092.50 1998.73 -4 1875.00 1754.51 -6
Construction Electrical General worker 2092.50 1964.52 -6 1875.00 1688.05 -10
Construction Building General worker 2092.50 1434.96 -31 1875.00 1301.16 -31
Finance Business services,  Cleaner 2092.50 1658.17 -21 1875.00 1541.26 -18
Contract cleaning
Forestry – Employee 2092.50 1138.71 -46% – – –
Manufacturing Furniture, bedding  Labourer 2092.50 1732.00 -17 1875.00 1732.00 -8
& upholstery
Manufacturing Curtaining General worker 2092.50 1635.31 -22 1875.00 1635.31 -13
Manufacturing Curtaining Labourer 2092.50 1580.00 -24 1875.00 1580.00 -16
Manufacturing Wood Labourer 2092.50 1505.00 -28 1875.00 1400.00 -25
Wholesale and  Restaurants, catering
retail trade  and allied trade General assistant 2092.50 – – 1875.00 1724.25 -8
Wholesale and  Restaurants, catering
retail trade and allied trade  General assistant 2092.50 – – 1875.00 1660.77 -11
Wholesale and 
retail trade Retail trade Forecourt attendant 2092.50 1660.12 -21 1875.00 1545.33 -18
Wholesale and 
 retail trade Meat Cleaner 2092.50 1645.96 -21 1875.00 1496.19 -20
Wholesale and  Restaurants, catering
retail trade and allied trade General assistant 2092.50 – – 1875.00 1399.02 -25
Average – – 2092.50 1639.10 -18 1875.00 1598.30 -15
Table 2. Minimum compensation threshold for 100% permanent disablement 
(2008-2009) and some minimum wages
Note 1: All compensations are increased annually, depending on Compensation Fund reserves available and not on changes of infl ation. 
Minimum wages also increase annually but, unlike compensations, the increases follow infl ation. The increases for both compensations 
and minimum wages are published in the Government Gazette.
Source: Compiled by the authors using other sources12,14
Industry Sub-sector Occupation COIDA Minimum Difference  Difference
 pension wage between   between 
(Rands (Rands COIDA COIDA Minimum COIDA
2009) 2009) pension  pension wage pension
 and (Rands (Rands and
  minimum 2008) 2008) minimum
wage  wage
 (Percentage  (Percentage
 2009)  2008)
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inclusive range from 31% to 99%, will be calculated on a pro 
rata basis to the pension for 100% disablement.
For permanent disablement assessed at 31% inclusive 
or more, the 2009 minimum earnings threshold is R2790 per 
month and the maximum earnings threshold is R19 931 per 
month. If an employee earns less than the minimum earn-
ings threshold, her compensation will be calculated using 
the minimum earnings rather than her own wage. Therefore, 
the minimum compensation pension for 100% permanent 
disablement is R2092.50 per month (i.e., R2790 × 75%). 
The maximum compensation pension for 100% permanent 
disablement is R14 948.25 (i.e., R19 931 × 75%). The com-
pensation pension – where, once more, the monthly earnings 
are subject to the minimum and maximum prescribed by the 
COIDA – is calculated according to,
(% Disablement) × (Monthly Gross Earnings × 75%), 
where (% Disablement) again is determined by Section 2 of 
the COIDA.1
3. TWO STYLIZED FACTS
Table 2 compares minimum wages in a number of occupa-
tions with the minimum compensation for 100% permanent 
disablement. The minimum compensation is R1875.00 for 
2008 and R2092.50 for 2009; while the average minimum 
wage for jobs of all sectors is R2451.24 for 2008 and 
R2723.80 for 2009.12 However, there is signifi cant variation 
in the minimum wage amount for each individual sector.
Employees (“labourers”) in the paper sector and in the 
petroleum manufacturing sectors received a minimum wage 
of between R4500 and R5000 in 2008 and 2009, i.e. more 
than double the minimum monthly pension payment from 
the COIDA.  Because these wages are above the minimum 
threshold, in the event of 100% permanent disablement, 
these employees are eligible for 75% of their wage. On 
the other hand, employees in the wood manufacturing 
sector and in the construction industry (“general workers”) 
only face a minimum monthly wage of between R1435 and 
R1505, which is up to 31% less than the monthly minimum 
pension they would receive from the COIDA. In the event of 
100% permanent disablement, these employees are eligible 
for a monthly pension that is approximately 46% higher than 
their wage.  Thus, we have a fi rst stylized fact (SF):  
SF1. In some instances, the minimum threshold for 
compensation for 100% permanent disablement 
exceeds gazetted minimum wages.
Additionally, as Table 2 further shows, the gap between 
compensation and minimum wages shows variation between 
sector and occupation, as well as from one year to another. 
In 2009, employees in construction earned 8% less than 
minimum compensation for permanent disablement under 
the COIDA, while a cleaner in wholesale and retail trade 
earned 21% less than the minimum compensation. Also, for 
employees in the manufacturing sector, the gap between 
compensation and minimum wage has grown from 2008 to 
2009, meaning that the manufacturing employees are earning 
comparatively less each year as compared to the minimum 
compensation threshold.
Table 3 gives this observed gap broader context.  It reports 
data over 2003–2009 on the Consumer Price Index (or CPI, 
the index used by economists to measure infl ation, and 
according to which annual increases for minimum wages are 
determined), the Permanent Disablement COIDA Minimum 
Pension, and the change in the latter.  Depending on sector, 
the minimum wages increase either at CPI + 1% (e.g., farm 
and forestry wages) or CPI + 2% (e.g., hospitality sector 
wages). Thus, Table 3 shows that over the relevant period 
and depending on sector, the average increase in minimum 
wages was approximately either 6.9% (i.e., average CPI + 
1%) or 7.9% (i.e., average CPI + 2%). But from 2003 to 2009 
the average increase to the minimum pension under the 
COIDA was 12.8%. Hence, minimum compensation pensions 
from permanent disablement, which are higher than some of 
the minimum wages, are also growing higher annually than 
the minimum wages. Therefore, the legislated compensation 
is out of line with at least a subset of minimum wages. While 
a longer time series would be useful to comment more fully, 
there still is a broad trend:  
SF2. There is no convergence in the growth rates of 
permanent compensation benefi ts and of minimum 
wages.
4. DISCUSSION
In the concrete South African case, we can identify three 
scenarios.
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Average
Annual average CPI (%) 5.8 1.4 3.4 4.6 7.2 11.5 7.1 5.9
Permanent disablement COIDA 1019.25 1146.15 1224.00 1410.75 1626.75 1875.00 2092.50 –
 minimum pension (Rands)
Annual growth in permanent  – 12.45 6.79 15.26 15.31 15.26 11.60 12.8
disablement COIDA minimum pension (%)
Table 3. CPI and minimum compensation pension fi gures
Note 1: The gazetted annual increase for minimum wages is CPI plus 1% or 2% depending on the sector. 
Note 2: From 2009, the CPI fi gures were calculated using a new basket of goods and new weights.
Note 3: The CPI above is the average rate for the year (for illustrative purposes), whereas, in general, the CPI used for wage increases is 
the one available six weeks prior to the increase. Wages in different sectors are increased at different times of the year, e.g., forestry 
wages are increased in April each year while those in farming are increased in March each year.12
Source: Compiled by the authors using other sources12,14-16
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(a) Within the inclusive minimum and maximum earnings 
threshold, the permanent disablement pension is 75% 
of gross earnings.
(b) If earnings are above the maximum earnings thresh-
old, then the employee receives less than 75% of her 
gross earnings in the form of a permanent disablement 
pension.
(c) If earnings are below the minimum earnings threshold, 
then the employee receives more than 75% of her 
gross earnings in the form of a permanent disable-
ment pension.
SF1 highlights that the minimum earnings threshold 
– (c) – is the weak link. For it is at this threshold that mis-
aligned incentives kick in: in some employment categories, 
the employee can obtain a monthly disablement pension 
greater than her minimum wage. This discrepancy is exac-
erbated if one considers that minimum wage legislation is 
not always complied to:  employees in many cases are 
receiving a wage lower than the legislated minimum.13
SF2 complicates matters. For it renders weak link (c) 
even weaker. SF2 enlarges moral hazard scope, namely 
it stimulates other incentives for intentional self-injury. 
The fact that the gap between compensation and wages 
keeps on getting larger and larger implies that the decis-
ion of intentionally injuring oneself keeps on getting more 
attractive as time goes on for the benefi ts of doing so are 
getting larger and larger.  Hence, all else equal, the maxi-
mum benefi t foregone of not intentionally injuring oneself 
increases with time.
Consider a forestry employee who earns R1138.71 
per month. In 2009, to obtain a permanent disablement 
pension equivalent to her monthly wage she would have 
to infl ict an injury of 55% permanent disablement (e.g., 
loss of arm between wrist and elbow). But if we consider 
the gap between compensation pensions and minimum 
wages and if wages and pensions continue to grow at their 
current rates, by 2015 our forestry employee will have to 
infl ict an injury of 39% permanent disablement (e.g., loss 
of four fi ngers and thumb of one hand) to obtain a pension 
that is equivalent to her wage; by 2020, the self-injury 
would need to be of 30%; in 2025, 23%; in 2030, 18%; in 
2035, 13%. If we consider the curtaining manufacturing 
sector the situation is not so different, where by 2035 the 
required self-injury would be 19%. The same holds for, 
e.g., agriculture, where in 2035 the fi gure would be 16%. 
And so on. (See Box 1 for the calculation formula.)
Recall now that a 30% and below injury is compensated 
only with a lump-sum payment. Eventually, the extent of 
self-injury for a minimum wage employee in any sector 
to obtain an equivalent permanent pension will reach the 
lowest limit for pension entitlement, namely 31% (e.g., 
the loss of a thumb and a little fi nger). Thus, as time goes 
by, the identifi ed moral hazard scope, which is defi ned in 
tandem by the current institutions of compensation and 
minimum wage, increases. 
5. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
In order to reduce moral hazard scope – assuming one 
wants to maintain both compensation and minimum wages 
– minimum wages and compensation pensions need to
be aligned.  In hindsight, there seem to be two immediate 
policy options to correct the mismatch. If we approach the 
matter from the perspective that the minimum permanent 
disablement pension is too high, the fi rst option is to 
decrease compensation in order for it to be in line with 
minimum wages. While simple, this policy option may 
cause social unrest as, e.g., individuals already receiv-
ing compensation may oppose it because they would be 
worse-off. The alternative is to approach the misalign-
ment from the perspective that minimum wages are too 
low. From this perspective, the second policy option is to 
increase minimum wages to be in line with compensation. 
However, an outright increase in minimum wages to exactly 
meet compensation, though popular for the politician in the 
short run, would be too high a price to pay for all in the 
long run; e.g., it would arguably increase labour market 
distortions. Therefore, neither of these immediate policy 
solutions would be advisable.
One alternative to an immediate policy solution 
approach – still in keeping with the assumption that one 
wants to maintain both compensation and minimum wages 
– is to try to remedy the misalignment by narrowing the
gap between minimum wages and minimum permanent 
disablement pensions gradually. If the minimum perman-
ent disablement pension threshold is kept constant or 
increased at a lower rate as compared to the minimum 
wage rate increases, then the gap between the two will 
narrow over time. In fact, provided the minimum perman-
ent disablement pension is increased at the same rate 
as infl ation, then employees and those who receive such 
pensions will not be worse-off in terms of their purchasing 
power. Since minimum wages increase at a rate one or 
two percentage points higher than the infl ation rate, this 
type of increase will ensure that minimum wages increase 
at a faster rate than the minimum permanent disablement 
pension. Thus the gap between the two will gradually 
close.  Once the gap has closed, a provision – essentially 
a fairly infl exible rule that also obviates discretionary inter-
ventions – can be made to ensure that both the minimum 
compensation pension and minimum wages increase at 
the same rate.
Take note, however, that closing the gap will not elimin-
ate moral hazard generally tied to compensation. Keeping 
everything else constant, the closure of the gap will only 
eliminate the exacerbation of the identifi ed moral hazard 
through time. Thus, even if possibility (c) is eliminated, 
the mere presence of compensation, as implied, creates 
room for moral hazard. Still, it is believed that the benefi t of 
having compensation outweighs the general moral hazard 
costs tied to it. As a result, the elimination of moral hazard 
requires a more resolute, if politically unpopular, policy.
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BOX 1. FORMULA FOR GROWTH RATES
Using data from Tables 2 and 3, the calculations are based on the following formula, where the averages from Table 3 
are proxies for growth rates:  
For example, if we consider agriculture (a “farmworker”) in 2015 and recall that the growth rate of the minimum wage is 
average CPI + 1 we obtain,
growth rate = 100× minimum wage(1 + growth rate of minimum wage)
 year – base year
minimum compensation(1 + growth rate of minimum compensation) year – base year
growth rate = 100×
R1316.69 (1+0.069) 2015–2009
R2092.50 (1+0.128)  2015–2009
=45.6%
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LESSONS LEARNED
1. Economic analysis suggests that the com-
bined social effects of the existing institutions
of worker compensation and minimum wages
increase moral hazard scope in South Africa.
2. An employee who receives a minimum wage
faces an increasing incentive to trade-off her
wage in favour of a permanent disablement
pension.
3. The increasing scope of moral hazard poses
 serious cost implications for South African
employers and, more generally, for society.
4. Policy recommendations in the form of bringing
annual increases of worker compensation in
line with infl ation to reduce the scope of moral
hazard are suggested.
6. CONCLUSION
The two public institutions of minimum wages and perma-
nent disablement pensions defi ne, in conjunction and for 
some employment categories, two related moral hazard 
problems.  The fi rst problem originates from a typical case 
of the left hand not knowing what the right one is doing 
– the COIDA1 was not designed considering the already-
existing institution of minimum wages. At the very least, 
this problem entails that the intended benefi cial socio-
economic effects of the two institutions in some instances 
may cancel each other out. The second problem, our 
main interest, originates from the widening gap between 
minimum wages and permanent disablement pensions. 
Since compensation pensions are increasing at a higher 
rate than minimum wages, the benefi ts from the last unit 
of intentional self-injury are increasingly outweighing their 
respective costs. However, from an economy-wide per-
spective – and of course this is the whole point –  matters 
are different: employers (and society) not only pay too 
much to provide workers’ compensation, but are doing 
so at a mounting pace. The responsibility shift is not free, 
and its excess burden increases every day.
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Abstract
Viewing issues from the perspective of workers’ compensation, the article highlights how for some South African
sectors the simultaneous provision of a minimum wage and a permanent disablement coverage increases moral
hazard scope. From an economy-wide perspective this increasing scope means that employers (and society) not
only pay too much to provide workers’ compensation, but are doing so at a mounting pace. The article considers
some policy options that are overall not too drastic as regards the elimination of the increasing scope, and in so
doing it also reminds us about the crucial importance of careful institutional design.
Key words: COIDA, minimum wages, moral hazard, public institutions, South Africa, workers’ compensation
1. Introduction
Workers’ compensation in South Africa is regulated by the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases
Act of 1993 (COIDA).1 Among other functions, the COIDA sets up a system of no-fault compensation for employees
who are injured or contract diseases because of their job. More precisely, it establishes that, with few exceptions, an
aggrieved party is entitled to compensation without the concurrent necessity to prove that any other party is at
fault.1,2
It is well-known that the presence of workers’ compensation creates excess burdens, or social inefficiencies, espec-
ially in the form of what economics terms moral hazard.3-6 Moral hazard basically involves a shifting of responsibility:
it occurs when an individual behaves differently according to whether or not she fully will bear the costs tied to the
consequences of her actions. For example, if our home is insured against theft, then we may more often leave the
windows ajar when we go to work, i.e. we are willing to incur a higher risk of theft as the insurance company will be
responsible for the consequences of theft. When there are misaligned incentives between the insured and the
insurer, because some of the actions of the insured – such as leaving the windows ajar – are hidden to the insurer,
we have room for moral hazard. With workers’ compensation – itself a form of insurance – matters are not much
different. Classic moral hazard examples in this case include an employee taking less care on the job (e.g., not
always wearing rubber gloves or safety goggles when required), reporting a permanent disablement that is not
causally related to the job (e.g., she could report a domestic accident as a work accident), and an employee
intentionally injuring herself.7,8 The bottom line is that moral hazard is one reflection of what economics terms rational
behaviour – namely that an individual usually opts for what’s best for her based on the evaluation of personal relative
costs and benefits, and not necessarily based on any ethical conduct or calculation of resulting cost transferred onto
others.
For simplicity, this article solely considers misaligned incentives tied to some aspects of the relation between two
extant public institutions, viz. minimum wages and permanent disablement coverage. It points out how at present,
for some sectors, the simultaneous public provision of a minimum wage and permanent disablement coverage
increases moral hazard scope, suggesting that the full socioeconomic objectives of compensation are neither as
efficient nor as equitable as commonly thought.
The argument considers matters from the perspective of workers’ compensation. Moreover, it employs stylized facts, a
common heuristic expedient in economics to abstract from data trends to aid theoretical reasoning.9-11 The stylized
facts are two, in the main regard minimum and maximum benefits for permanent disablement and a sample of
minimum wages, and are based on recent data that are openly available. The first stylized fact identifies the origin of
the moral hazard of interest, while the second – which defines our principal concern – indicates why the scope of the
moral hazard of interest widens as time goes by. Thus, our point about exacerbating misaligned incentives derives
from institutional considerations, rather than from any moral hazard instance. We conclude, however, that not all may
be lost, at least as regards the second fact: there are some policy options that are not in the main overly drastic, and
that at the same time remind us about how important it is to perform careful institutional design.
2. Coverage for permanent disablement according to the COIDA: Some basics
Permanent disablement, which can range from 1% to 100%, means that an occupational injury or disease results in
a permanent anatomical defect, loss of anatomical function or disfigurement that is tantamount to disablement for
employment.1 Permanent disablement thus can include total or partial loss of a limb, impairment of movement of a
joint, loss of vision or hearing, restricted lung function, or loss of an organ. Table 1 reports degrees of permanent
disablement.
Under the COIDA, compensation for permanent disablement is paid either in a lump-sum or as a monthly pension
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threshold is R2790 per month and the maximum earnings threshold is R11 163 per month. If an employee earns
less than the minimum earnings threshold, her compensation will be calculated using the minimum earnings figure
rather than her own wage. Therefore, the minimum lump-sum compensation for 30% permanent disablement is
R41850 (i.e., 15 × R2790).
To illustrate, consider the case of the permanent disablement from the loss of one ear. According to the COIDA
guidelines reproduced in Table 1, this is a 7% permanent disablement that will yield the lump-sum compensation of
[(7% × 100)/30)] × (15 × Monthly Gross Earnings). The generic calculation for permanent disablement up to 30% –
where the monthly earnings are subject to the minimum and maximum prescribed by the COIDA – accordingly is,
[(% Disablement × 100)/30] × (15 × Monthly Gross Earnings),
where (% Disablement) is determined by Section 2 of the COIDA.
If the permanent disablement is assessed at 31% inclusive or more, then the employee will receive a monthly
pension for life. Compensation for 100% permanent disablement is calculated at 75% of the employee’s monthly
earnings, again subject to a prescribed maximum and minimum of such earnings. The pension for permanent
disablement, within the inclusive range from 31% to 99%, will be calculated on a pro rata basis to the pension for
100% disablement.
For permanent disablement assessed at 31% inclusive or more, the 2009 minimum earnings threshold is R2790 per
month and the maximum earnings threshold is R19 931 per month. If an employee earns less than the minimum
earnings threshold, her compensation will be calculated using the minimum earnings rather than her own wage.
Therefore, the minimum compensation pension for 100% permanent disablement is R2092.50 per month (i.e.,
R2790 × 75%). The maximum compensation pension for 100% permanent disablement is R14 948.25 (i.e., R19
931 × 75%). The compensation pension – where, once more, the monthly earnings are subject to the minimum and
maximum prescribed by the COIDA – is calculated according to,
(% Disablement) × (Monthly Gross Earnings × 75%), where (% Disablement) again is determined by Section 2 of
the COIDA.1
3. Two stylized facts
Table 2 compares minimum wages in a number of occupations with the minimum compensation for 100%
permanent disablement. The minimum compensation is R1875.00 for 2008 and R2092.50 for 2009; while the
average minimum wage for jobs of all sectors is R2451.24 for 2008 and R2723.80 for 2009.12 However, there is
significant variation in the minimum wage amount for each individual sector.
Employees (“labourers”) in the paper sector and in the petroleum manufacturing sectors received a minimum
wage of between R4500 and R5000 in 2008 and 2009, i.e. more than double the minimum monthly pension
payment from the COIDA. Because these wages are above the minimum threshold, in the event of 100%
permanent disablement, these employees are eligible for 75% of their wage. On the other hand, employees in
the wood manufacturing sector and in the construction industry (“general workers”) only face a minimum monthly
wage of between R1435 and R1505, which is up to 31% less than the monthly minimum pension they would
receive from the COIDA. In the event of 100% permanent disablement, these employees are eligible for a
monthly pension that is approximately 46% higher than their wage. Thus, we have a first stylized fact (SF):
SF1. In some instances, the minimum threshold for compensation for 100% permanent disablement
exceeds gazetted minimum wages.
Additionally, as Table 2 further shows, the gap between compensation and minimum wages shows variation
between sector and occupation, as well as from one year to another. In 2009, employees in construction earned
8% less than minimum compensation for permanent disablement under the COIDA, while a cleaner in wholesale
and retail trade earned 21% less than the minimum compensation. Also, for employees in the manufacturing sector,
the gap between compensation and minimum wage has grown from 2008 to 2009, meaning that the manufacturing
employees are earning comparatively less each year as compared to the minimum compensation threshold.
Table 3 gives this observed gap broader context. It reports data over 2003–2009 on the Consumer Price Index (or
CPI, the index used by economists to measure inflation, and according to which annual increases for minimum
wages are determined), the Permanent Disablement COIDA Minimum Pension, and the change in the latter.
Depending on sector, the minimum wages increase either at CPI + 1% (e.g., farm and forestry wages) or CPI + 2%
(e.g., hospitality sector wages). Thus, Table 3 shows that over the relevant period and depending on sector, the
average increase in minimum wages was approximately either 6.9% (i.e., average CPI + 1%) or 7.9% (i.e., average
CPI + 2%). But from 2003 to 2009 the average increase to the minimum pension under the COIDA was 12.8%.
Hence, minimum compensation pensions from permanent disablement, which are higher than some of the minimum
wages, are also growing higher annually than the minimum wages. Therefore, the legislated compensation is out of
line with at least a subset of minimum wages. While a longer time series would be useful to comment more fully,
there still is a broad trend:
SF2. There is no convergence in the growth rates of permanent compensation benefits and of minimum
wages.
4. Discussion
In the concrete South African case, we can identify three scenarios.
(a) Within the inclusive minimum and maximum earnings threshold, the permanent disablement pension is 75% of
gross earnings.
(b) If earnings are above the maximum earnings threshold, then the employee receives less than 75% of her gross
earnings in the form of a permanent disablement pension.
(c) If earnings are below the minimum earnings threshold, then the employee receives more than 75% of her gross
earnings in the form of a permanent disablement pension.
SF1 highlights that the minimum earnings threshold – (c) – is the weak link. For it is at this threshold that misaligned
incentives kick in: in some employment categories, the employee can obtain a monthly disablement pension greater
than her minimum wage. This discrepancy is exacerbated if one considers that minimum wage legislation is not
always complied to: employees in many cases are receiving a wage lower than the legislated minimum.13
SF2 complicates matters. For it renders weak link (c) even weaker. SF2 enlarges moral hazard scope, namely it
stimulates other incentives for intentional self-injury. The fact that the gap between compensation and wages keeps
on getting larger and larger implies that the decision of intentionally injuring oneself keeps on getting more attractive
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18%; in 2035, 13%. If we consider the curtaining manufacturing sector the situation is not so different, where by
2035 the required self-injury would be 19%. The same holds for, e.g., agriculture, where in 2035 the figure would
be 16%. And so on. (See Box 1 for the calculation formula.)
Recall now that a 30% and below injury is compensated only with a lump-sum payment. Eventually, the extent of
self-injury for a minimum wage employee in any sector to obtain an equivalent permanent pension will reach the
lowest limit for pension entitlement, namely 31% (e.g., the loss of a thumb and a little finger). Thus, as time goes by,
the identified moral hazard scope, which is defined in tandem by the current institutions of compensation and
minimum wage, increases.
5. Policy considerations
In order to reduce moral hazard scope – assuming one wants to maintain both compensation and minimum wages
– minimum wages and compensation pensions need to be aligned. In hindsight, there seem to be two immediate
policy options to correct the mismatch. If we approach the matter from the perspective that the minimum permanent
disablement pension is too high, the first option is to decrease compensation in order for it to be in line with
minimum wages. While simple, this policy option may cause social unrest as, e.g., individuals already receiving
compensation may oppose it because they would be worse-off. The alternative is to approach the misalignment
from the perspective that minimum wages are too low. From this perspective, the second policy option is to increase
minimum wages to be in line with compensation. However, an outright increase in minimum wages to exactly meet
compensation, though popular for the politician in the short run, would be too high a price to pay for all in the long
run; e.g., it would arguably increase labour market distortions. Therefore, neither of these immediate policy
solutions would be advisable.
One alternative to an immediate policy solution approach – still in keeping with the assumption that one wants to
maintain both compensation and minimum wages – is to try to remedy the misalignment by narrowing the gap
between minimum wages and minimum permanent disablement pensions gradually. If the minimum permanent
disablement pension threshold is kept constant or increased at a lower rate as compared to the minimum wage rate
increases, then the gap between the two will narrow over time. In fact, provided the minimum permanent
disablement pension is increased at the same rate as inflation, then employees and those who receive such
pensions will not be worse-off in terms of their purchasing power. Since minimum wages increase at a rate one or
two percentage points higher than the inflation rate, this type of increase will ensure that minimum wages increase
at a faster rate than the minimum permanent disablement pension. Thus the gap between the two will gradually
close. Once the gap has closed, a provision – essentially a fairly inflexible rule that also obviates discretionary
interventions – can be made to ensure that both the minimum compensation pension and minimum wages increase
at the same rate.
Take note, however, that closing the gap will not eliminate moral hazard generally tied to compensation. Keeping
everything else constant, the closure of the gap will only eliminate the exacerbation of the identified moral hazard
through time. Thus, even if possibility (c) is eliminated, the mere presence of compensation, as implied, creates
room for moral hazard. Still, it is believed that the benefit of having compensation outweighs the general moral
hazard costs tied to it. As a result, the elimination of moral hazard requires a more resolute, if politically unpopular,
policy.
6. Conclusion
The two public institutions of minimum wages and permanent disablement pensions define, in conjunction and
for some employment categories, two related moral hazard problems. The first problem originates from a typical
case of the left hand not knowing what the right one is doing – the COIDA1 was not designed considering the
already-existing institution of minimum wages. At the very least, this problem entails that the intended beneficial
socioeconomic effects of the two institutions in some instances may cancel each other out. The second problem,
our main interest, originates from the widening gap between minimum wages and permanent disablement
pensions. Since compensation pensions are increasing at a higher rate than minimum wages, the benefits from
the last unit of intentional self-injury are increasingly outweighing their respective costs. However, from an
economy-wide perspective – and of course this is the whole point – matters are different: employers (and
society) not only pay too much to provide workers’ compensation, but are doing so at a mounting pace. The
responsibility shift is not free, and its excess burden increases every day.
Lessons Learned
1. Economic analysis suggests that the combined social effects of the existing institutions of worker compensation
and minimum wages increase moral hazard scope in South Africa.
2. An employee who receives a minimum wage faces an increasing incentive to trade-off her wage in favour of a
permanent disablement pension.
3. The increasing scope of moral hazard poses serious cost implications for South African employers and, more
generally, for society.
4. Policy recommendations in the form of bringing annual increases of worker compensation in line with inflation to
reduce the scope of moral hazard are suggested.
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